Communication is an integral part of emergency response, and improving the information dissemination network for crisis communication can save time, resources, and lives. In a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak, timeliness of detection and response are critical. An outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, a particularly significant FAD, could cripple the agriculture economy. This research uses communication data from a FAD response exercise in Kansas to develop a reliable crisis communication network model, contributing a general method for creating an information dissemination network from empirical communication data. We then introduce a simulated annealing heuristic that identifies an alternative network structure that minimizes the time for information to reach all response participants. The resultant network structure reduces overall information transmission time by almost 90% and reveals actionable observations for improving FAD response communication. We find that not only can a crisis communication network be improved significantly, but also that the quantitative results support qualitative observations from early in the data extraction process. This paper adds original methods to the literature and opens the door for future quantitative work in the area of crisis communication and emergency response.
Introduction
In a catastrophic event, getting the right information to the right people in an expeditious manner is paramount to security and to proper execution of emergency response. Foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak responses require multi-stakeholder communication to limit disease spread, safeguard the nation's food supply, and minimize economic impacts. In fact, the Food and Agriculture Sector is designated a critical infrastructure sector (Department of Homeland Security 2015). Thus, crisis communication during FAD responses is an important part of homeland security and emergency management.
Motivated by the need to better understand and improve crisis response communication, this paper employs network models. These models capture key crisis communication system components, making it possible to analyze current systems and identify opportunities for improvement. The two main network model components are nodes, which represent individuals or organizations, and arcs, which represent information flow between nodes. These components define a network structure by which information is shared. This paper's aim is to introduce an effective method for determining an improved information dissemination network structure for crisis communication operations using empirical data. Specifically, this research provides a framework for converting the many types of communication logs, operating procedure documents, and other sources gathered from an animal disease outbreak response exercise to effectively model its information dissemination network. We demonstrate that information flow can be greatly improved through practical alterations in the communication patterns of those involved in a FAD response exercise or actual event. The
In October 2013, the KDA conducted a FAD response exercise engaging key stakeholders who would be involved in an actual FAD emergency. This particular exercise involved a simulated FMD outbreak in the United States and the movement of an infected animal into Kansas. The exercise began at 8:00 AM on October 9, 2013, and ended the next day at 1:00 PM with an overnight pause in the exercise from 5:00 PM to 8:00 AM. The stakeholders, or players, in the exercise represented many organizations and individuals on the federal, state, local, and industry levels. Local organizations included county emergency management personnel, law enforcement, and administration for the most impacted counties in the exercise scenario. At the state level, KDA was represented along with the state veterinarian, the Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE), the Movement Control Branch (MCB), the Kansas Department of Emergency Management (KDEM), and state veterinarians from other nearby states. The federal level was represented by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Kansas State University (KSU) also played a significant role in the exercise due to simulated events surrounding the College of Veterinary Medicine (CVM) and the Animal Sciences and Industry (ASI) Department. During an emergency event, many of these organizations and key players co-locate to central EOCs. In this exercise, there were multiple EOCs in play. The state had its own EOC, called the Kansas State Emergency Operations Center (KSEOC), as did each county, KSU, and the KSU Animal Sciences and Industry Department. Some stakeholders that would otherwise have a role in an actual outbreak did not participate in the exercise and instead were represented by KDA personnel. Scripts with pre-constructed communications or actions for key events were used to represent these stakeholders' interactions in the exercise environment.
Exercise observers and moderators were assigned by KDA to the most important locations and personnel in the exercise to document communications and evaluate FAD response actions. Locations with a dedicated observer included KDA, KSU Animal Sciences and Industry EOC, KSEOC, and MCB. County EOC communication was logged through a web-based discussion portal.
Research Outline
This research is motivated by the need for KDA and similar agencies to better understand and improve crisis response. We hypothesize that information flow can be greatly improved through practical alterations in the communication patterns of those involved in a FAD response exercise or actual event. We explore this question using tools from network modeling, discrete event simulation, and local search heuristics. Our findings provide insight not only for FAD preparedness in the state of Kansas, but also for improving crisis communication networks in other contexts.
Literature Review
Our research contributions lie in the intersection of multiple literature streams that each address components of crisis response communication networks. This paper simultaneously integrates four characteristics not previously combined in the literature.
1. Communication. It relates specifically to communication and information flow versus other network model types.
2. Quantitative. The proposed methods are quantitative in nature rather than qualitative.
3. Prescriptive. It is prescriptive instead of descriptive. The research provides a method or solution to be used in the future, rather than solely describing attributes of past events.
4. Official. The interactions studied are primarily among official responders, rather than the general public or social networks. The data are drawn from official communications and not taken from social media or other unofficial sources. Figure 2 shows how five related areas of research, each of which exhibit a subset of these four core characteristics, reveal a gap in the research filled by this paper. This section describes this gap, examining each of the five research areas in relation to this work. 
Automated Detection and Technology
Automated detection and technology have led to improved detection and response times for crises in such areas as oil refineries and nuclear plants (Popovich, Henderson, and Stinn 2002; Yang, Yang, and Plotnick 2013; Seki et al. 2015; Sharma et al. 2015; Elsass, McKenna, and Schildkraut 2016) . The proposed approaches were prescriptive in that they aim to improve response for future emergency events; they also applied to official interactions. However, the literature proposing and discussing these methods did not use empirical data or analyze the impacts quantitatively.
Social Media
Social media plays an increasingly significant role in disaster communication. Past research regarding social media network models was quantitative, prescriptive, and applied to crisis communication, but often the interactions that were studied were not official. In particular, researchers have introduced techniques that turn communication instances into quantifiable data and methods to evaluate how information moves through the network (Song and Yan 2012; Sjoberg et al. 2013; Slavkovikj et al. 2014; Houston et al. 2015) . Sjoberg et al. (2013) examined social media use in bioterrorism incidents, finding opportunities for law enforcement and health officials to improve situational awareness through social media data mining. Gao et al. (2014) used mobile phone data to quantify users' communication patterns during a variety of anomalous events -a bombing, jet scare, concert, and plane crash. Finally, (Song and Yan 2012) simulated social networks to analyze how the public became informed of a crisis through online social media. While these three papers described quantitative analyses, the first was not prescriptive, and the latter two considered unofficial communication.
Inter-agency Communication
Effective FAD response is dependent on organizations working together, communicating, and making good decisions in concert with one another. Thus, inter-agency communication studies are relevant to our work. Much prior inter-agency communication research lacked quantitative analysis and prescriptive recommendations, but the interactions that were studied are official in nature and related directly to crisis communication. Prior work highlighted the importance of inter-agency communication to crisis response during Hurricane Katrina (Garnett and Kouzmin 2007) and the 2012 Tongariro eruptions in New Zealand (Leonard et al. 2014 ) and identified opportunities for quantitative methods to improve future efforts. Likewise, despite an increase in communication studies related to public health emergency preparedness, recent work emphasized the importance of sharing knowledge between organizations and discussed the disproportionally low number of quantitative models of these processes (Savoia et al. 2009; Savoia, Lin, and Viswanath 2013) . Breen and Parrish (2013) also found poor inter-organizational communication during crises across GIS mediums. Their research employed statistical methods, but this quantitative analysis was of qualitative data from surveys and not communication instances. The work of (Zhao et al. 2012 ) is pertinent to our research and differs from other works in this field because it was both prescriptive and quantitative. However, it did not relate directly to crisis communication but focused instead on inter-organizational partnerships based on empirical data of a known inter-organization collaboration network. Their method looked at four different organizational strategies and four unique networks to develop the best possible collaboration network (thus, being prescriptive). Similarly, the FAD response network is improved in this paper using simulation across many possible networks with four strategies to determine their structures. Inter-organizational communication is a critical research area with room for quantitative models like this one to complement existing qualitative methods.
Epidemiology
Epidemiology modeling is applicable to this research because disease spread can be represented similarly to information spread (Borgatti 2005) . While many items (for example, physical goods) move through a network in such a way that there are no duplicates, information and diseases both propagate by making a copy of the information/disease being passed before sending it along. Thus, the quantitative and prescriptive characteristics of epidemiological models also may be utilized to analyze crisis communication.
Contact networks are the basis for epidemiological models. Disease spread is often modeled using stochastic processes where individuals alternate between states. A basic approach is the Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model, where individuals begin in a susceptible state to an infection and move to the infected state according to a probability distribution, only to return again after the infection passes (Clayton and Hills 1993; Diekmann and Heesterbeek 2000) . Our research models information dissemination where people and organizations transition from being uninformed to informed. Other researchers have expanded this model by adding an information dissemination network to the typical epidemiological model wherein behavioral patterns change (altering the disease spread rate) as people become aware of the disease (Youssef and Scoglio 2013; Shakeri et al. 2015) . Youssef and Scoglio (2013) used heuristics, similar to our research, to identify contact adaptation patterns that minimized the necessary connections in the information dissemination network while still effectively mitigating the epidemic. Shakeri et al. (2015) produced an effective information dissemination strategy that resulted in greater disease suppression over a wider range of infection rates using fewer resources. Our research combines these two ideas by identifying effective information dissemination efficacy through contact network alteration.
2009 Australian Bushfires
Very few papers in the scholarly literature simultaneously considered quantitative analysis of official interactions in crisis communication. Those that did focused on a single event: the 2009 Australian bushfires. The empirical communication data from this event among official responders set it apart from other such events, and these data also relate the work more closely to our research. Empirical data are needed to justifiably model this type of communication network because human decision-making is very difficult to predict (Kennedy 2012) , especially when faced with crisis circumstances that can easily cloud or shift an otherwise logical choice. We build on (Au 2011) and (Hamra et al. 2014) by not only developing the network with empirical data, but also adding a prescriptive characteristic to guide improved future solutions. Au (2011) used the time-stamped communications data between bushfire responders to develop a network model and then analyzed this network using two different network metrics. Au organized the nodes by organization and developed a complex network where arc weights represented the number of communication instances between the nodes. The network analysis revealed important gaps in the communication network at various phases of the fires. Hamra et al. (2014) applied social network analysis to the bushfire data to determine whether actors' network interactions help drive the success or failure of bushfire responses. They used communication data from two separate responses, one of which was far more successful than the other, to evaluate which network aspects most impact the response effectiveness. Among these aspects were various measures of centrality, or how connected a node was with the rest of the network (Freeman 1977; Girvan and Newman 2002) , network density, brokers, and bridges. Brokers are nodes or actors that provide interaction between two clusters of nodes, while bridges are communication links that span these gaps (Braithwaite 2010; Long, Cunningham, and Braithwaite 2013) . Our research also accounts for some of these aspects and the impact they have on the network's performance.
Research Goals and Contributions
This review of the scholarly literature in crisis communication and emergency response shows a lack in quantitative analysis of predictive methods for official communication. This paper fills that gap in a way that is novel, impactful and replicable. To our knowledge, it is the first publicly available research analyzing a FAD emergency response communication network of any kind. Our research expands the application of simulated annealing as well by using the heuristic to alter a communication network. We also use network simulation as a method to determine the simulated annealing objective function. Both are firsts in the literature. These elements are illustrated using the 2013 Kansas FAD response exercise, but the principles are generalizable to many information dissemination network applications.
Methodology -Network Simulation Model
In this section, we describe the proposed modeling framework, including the definitions of important network principles and an example of the information dissemination network used in the case study. We then describe the empirical data and the process developed to extract necessary information from these records, translating communication instances into a network structure. The model details then are described, after which we present results and validation. The final product is a communication network simulation model based on empirical data that observes information from multiple sources as it flows throughout the network.
Network Definition

Graph Components
Information dissemination among FAD response stakeholders is modeled on a graph G = (N, A) , where nodes in N represent players (individuals or agencies) and arcs in A represent communications between players. Arc (i,j) models information transmitted from node i to node j. The weight w ij associated with arc (i,j) represents the strength of the connection between nodes i and j; node pairs with higher weights on the arc connecting them communicate more frequently than those with lower weights. In the context of this paper, a connection is stronger if it has more documented communication instances between the two nodes. This information is summarized in an n × n weighted adjacency matrix W where n = |N| and w ij is the element in the ith row and the jth column of W. Thus, for every position in W where w ij > 0, there is an arc in the network from i to j. Two arcs between a pair of nodes represent a bi-directional relationship. Similarly, an arc from a node to itself reveals intra-node communication. Finally, each node has total weight = ∑ =1 .
Some nodes represent more than one player. These group nodes may transmit information more quickly than those representing only one individual. To capture important features, each node, i, is assigned a maximum capacity max and current capacity λ i . Because a node can represent more than one person, it is important to be able to treat successive receipts of information separately. max is the total number of players represented by node i and represents how many distinct persons in that node can receive information. The current capacity is initially 0 for each node and increases each time a node receives information, indicating how many times information has reached that node since the onset. Please see Appendix I for an example.
Information Flow
Information dissemination through the network is modeled using discrete event simulation. In the simulation model, information is transmitted from one "sending" node to another "receiving" node. At the beginning of the simulation, one node is declared to be the originator of the information (more on how this is determined later in the section). The receiving node is determined using a probability matrix, P. In this matrix, = , where p ij is the probability of sending node i choosing to transmit to node j.
Informed
During the discrete event simulation, we track the "informed" status of each node and of the network. A node i is informed when the number of times it receives the information passing through the network (λ i ) reaches its maximum capacity ( max ). A network is informed when all nodes are informed, or = max for all . The time at which the network is informed is the primary metric in this research. An example is described in Appendix I.
Converting Data to a Model
The previously described network structure may be used to represent crisis communications from an exercise or an actual response. We demonstrate the approach using KDA exercise data that capture documented communications in the form of call logs, moderator comments, scripts for players that do not participate directly, copies of emails, and procedure manuals, all in different levels of organization and clarity. This section describes the process of using this data to construct a network model that can be used to understand and improve the communication system. We first use the documented communications and expert knowledge to determine clusters of like players to organize into nodes with corresponding capacities. A data extraction process of the documented communications then determines what edges exist in the network and their respective weights, revealing interesting characteristics of the resultant network.
Determining Clusters
In a FAD response, many entities are involved, spanning all levels of government and numerous civilian and industry sectors. In a large-scale FAD exercise, players can number in the hundreds to thousands. In an actual event, when the public and news media become involved, that number is far greater. Thus, it is not reasonable to expect accurate or comprehensive communication logs for each player. Additionally, even with that sort of data, altering the network structure in a way that reveals general observations of the structure and information flow would be very challenging. One method to make a detailed network like this more generalized is to divide the players into groups, or clusters (Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993) , which are then represented as nodes in the information dissemination network. Clusters for the KDA case study are generated prior to data extraction with expert input. Table 1 provides the resulting network nodes and corresponding labels that are used throughout the paper. 
Data Extraction Process
Here we describe the data extraction process used to develop the network structure for this FAD exercise. The process is generalizable to other information dissemination networks with similar data. The required time to extract data depends on the data format and quality.
1. Compile all applicable data logs, communication logs, and any standard operating procedures or emergency management policies that help inform proper reporting procedures.
2. Use the existing documented policies and procedures to develop a list of possible organizations, individuals or positions within those organizations, and the clusters to which those organizations belong. Individuals and positions are both encapsulated by the term player in this paper. The reasoning is that there are instances where a position is filled by multiple individuals but specifying each person is not necessary. For instance, an organization may have a role that rotates daily among multiple people, in which case the importance in the communication is that it comes from that position and not from the individual. There also are instances where an individual's name is not provided, in which case the position must suffice. This occurs often in standard operating procedures to allow for personnel turnover.
3. Create a master communication log, called the Extracted Transmission List, from the collection of communication and data logs tracking the following: transmission time; organization, position/name, and cluster for both sending and receiving players; and mode of communication (email, phone call, conference call, etc). It is helpful to include what was said to track how specific information flows through the network.
Only the transmission time and sending/receiving clusters and positions will be used in developing the network structure for this particular research. However, the rest of the extracted information could be used for future work or may be needed for other information dissemination scenarios.The sending and receiving players' roles are significant and warrant further discussion. For general purposes, it is assumed that the one making the phone call, sending the email, or initiating the conference call is the one passing along information. However, there are instances where the initiator of the communication (e.g., the person who makes the phone call) is actually on the receiving end of the information flow. In these cases, the sending and receiving players should be logged according to the actual information flow. An example of this from the Kansas exercise is the Public node (labeled Q in Table 1 ). In all but one instance, the Public initiated communication with another node, but it was asking for information, not sending new information. This is difficult to distinguish in most transmissions because the conversation content is not usually welldocumented. But when it is clear, as in the case of the Public node, the transmission log should represent information flow.
4. Reorganize the Extracted Transmission List by transmission time.
5. Set w ij as the number of transmissions from node i to node j and max as the number of unique individuals associated with node i in the Extracted Transmission List.
In all for the Kansas exercise, there are 431 transmissions from more than 70 documents with the players in these transmissions broken down into 18 distinct clusters. Table 2 shows the resulting weight matrix, W, for the network, as well as the total weight, w i , and maximum capacity, max , for each node. Additionally, Figure 3 gives a visual representation of this network with the thickness of the arcs corresponding to their weight. 
Observations of KDA Exercise Data
Based on the representation of the KDA (I) exercise data in Figure 3 , we observe the following:
• KDA (I) is the biggest hub by far in the network, both in receiving and sending information, yet its capacity is comparatively small. This could indicate that it is not structured to sustain its communication demands.
• Federal (D) receives all of its information from the KSU CVM (L) but sends information to many nodes.
• The Movement Control Branch (N) and County/Local Law Enforcement (A) are very closely related.
• KDHE (J), County/Local Administration (B), and Individual Producers (E) all receive information from a singular source (KDA (I), County/Local Emergency Management (C), and KSU CVM (L), respectively).
• More intra-county communication is expected. This could be a byproduct of the large number of County/Local Emergency Management (C) to Unknown (R) links, which may be a result of the exercise design that had limited counties participating.
• Industry Association (F) unexpectedly has no communication with the Individual Producers (E).
Simulation Model Design and Parameter Selection
Given the network representation of the FAD response data, the next objective is to simulate the information flow through the network. This section describes the selection of nodes from which information originates in the simulation, the sequence of simulation events, and the processes used to select simulation parameters.
Information Injects
The simulation model depicts information flow through three injects, each replicated numerous times. These three injects constitute pieces of information originating at three different nodes and represent the most common and important sources of information from the exercise itself. The first inject simulates information originating at KDA (I), the coordinating organization of the FAD exercise. KDA is by far the most active of all nodes with more than twice the total weight in w I than any other node. It also introduces the most new information to the FAD exercise of all nodes, making it a natural choice to originate information in the simulation model. The second inject choice represents initial detection, the most critical piece of information in a FAD outbreak. In most cases, the signs of a possible FAD, like foot-and-mouth disease, are originally noticed by an animal's owner, represented in this network as an Individual Producer (E). Finally, another common information source in the exercise is the Federal node (D), which communicates requirements and directives to states impacted by the FAD. Communication from the Federal node also can represent information from an event in another region where entities are not otherwise connected to the nodes in this model. It is possible to model information origination from all network nodes or even just one, and some applications may warrant such decisions, but for this particular exercise, the three selected injects are most relevant.
Sequence of Simulation Events
Algorithm 1 (Figure 4) shows the pseudo-code for this simulation. In broad terms, the simulation begins at time 0 initializing the current capacity array for the nodes (set to 0), and the next transmission time for each node (set to infinity until the node receives the information for the first time). The current capacity of the originating node is set to one and its first transmission time is determined. The sending node is determined by the smallest transmission time of all the nodes. At a node's transmission time, the transmission recipient is determined. The receiving node's current capacity is incremented by one (unless it is already at λ max ), and the sending node receives a new next transmission time. The receiving node will also receive a next transmission time if its current time is still at infinity. The simulation loops through the transmission times until all nodes have reached their maximum capacity, making the entire network informed. We replicate the simulation 400 times for each inject. (We perform multiple replications to ensure with 95% confidence that the true average informed time is within 100 minutes of the observed average informed time from the simulation replications. Appendix II describes the method for determining the necessary number of replications.) We use an exponential distribution to determine node transmission times, where the exponential parameter of node i is a function of the node's total weight, w i , and maximum capacity, max , identified through a series of linear regressions (Pleuss 2016) .
Model Validation
Ideally, validation for this system would include following a single piece of information from one of the inject sources through the Extracted Transmission List until it reaches every player at every node, noting each node's informed time and comparing them to the simulated results. However, there is no such information thread available in the exercise data. Instead, we identify two pieces of critical information with the most communication instances in the data. These are observed in nine and seven nodes, respectively, throughout the exercise. The first piece of information coincides with the beginning of the exercise where the Federal node tells KDA of a presumptive positive FMD case in Alabama. This event is an example of inject 3 of the model, where the Federal node originates information to the network. The second is when a bull with possible FMD is discovered in the Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine (L). This event most closely resembles inject 2 of the model where an individual producer (E) introduces information to the network. Analyses of these two events are detailed in Appendix III and demonstrate that the simulation model effectively predicts the information flow in the exercise. Thus, we conclude that the proposed model is a valid representation of the crisis communication network from the exercise.
Simulation Model Results
Each simulation replication produces an informed time for the network. The informed times for each node and for the whole network are recorded for each replication. Table 3 and Figure 5 show the average informed time for the 400 replications for each node and inject, as well as the average informed time of the overall network. These results provide insight about the current network structure and help identify future directions for improvement. Interestingly, information originating at the Individual Producer (node E, inject 2) moves through the network quicker than that originating at nodes with both higher total weight and maximum capacity (nodes I and D, injects 1 and 3, respectively). This is due to the decrease in informed time to the Local Veterinarians (node M), which are only contacted in the network by the Individual Producers. It also indicates a potential opportunity to improve the network by adding more inbound arcs to Local Veterinarians.
Another intriguing result is the large difference between the average network informed time and the highest node informed times for each inject. For instance, the network informed time for inject 1 is 3661.94 minutes but the highest node time is Local Veterinarians (E) at 2953.90 minutes, a difference of almost 700 minutes. This shows the large variance in the network towards the end of the simulation. There are four nodes for inject 1 that have an average informed time more than 2000 minutes [County/Local Administration (C), Federal (D), Individual Producer (E), Local Veterinarians (M)], and these four tend to alternate which node is the last to be informed over the 400 replications. These nodes also exhibit greater variability in average informed times (average standard deviation of 968 minutes) than the other nodes (average standard deviations of 148 minutes). Again, this indicates a need to increase incoming communication links to these four nodes.
In Section 3.2.2, some observations were noted based on the communication network in Figure 3 . The simulation model results confirm and give greater understanding to some of those initial observations.
• KDA (I) was identified as an information hub, which these results confirm; it has the second fastest average informed time despite having one of the highest maximum capacities in the network.
• Federal (D) is very much affected by only receiving information from KSU College of Veterinary Medicine (L) as it is one of the last three informed nodes for all injects.
• The Movement Control Branch (N) and County/Local Law Enforcement (C) are closely related. Their informed times shift almost identically over the three injects. This is likely a product of the fact that most of these nodes' communications are with each other.
These discoveries reveal interesting characteristics of the original network and the need for an improved network structure. Without changes, particularly to the nodes with the highest informed times, expeditious transfer of critical information to all players in this FMD response will be impractical at best.
Methodology -Identifying Improved Network Structures
Section 3 introduced a network simulation model based on actual communication data and described the simulated performance of the current network structure. We now introduce a simulated annealing heuristic to efficiently identify alternative network structures with improved performance. The approach makes it possible to compare candidate network structures with the original network and each other.
Simulated Annealing Overview
We use a local search metaheuristic, simulated annealing (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi 1983) , to identify an improved network for the FAD response exercise. In each iteration, it considers a small well-defined change from the current solution to get a new solution. The method develops a list of feasible "neighboring" solutions from which one will be chosen and evaluated. The proposed version of simulated annealing is novel in that it uses discrete event simulation to calculate the network performance in each iteration.
Neighborhood
This section describes feasible network structures and the definition of neighbors. The primary operation in a simulated annealing algorithm is selecting a new solution that is in the current solution's "neighborhood".
A solution network structure is defined by its weight matrix. The original weight matrix used in Section 3 is denoted W 0 , while subsequent network structures are denoted W k for each iteration k. Network structure changes are considered feasible only if they correspond to communication that could occur in practice. For instance, the Federal node would not communicate directly to the Local Veterinarian node in practice. Table 2 bold/underlines cells eligible for adjustment from the original weight matrix, W 0 , based on expert system knowledge.
Feasible network structures must also satisfy a zero-sum rule for outgoing weights. That is, any outgoing link weight deducted from w ij must be added to some w ik with the same sending node, i. This considers the potential limitations on how many transmissions one cluster of players can actually make.
Each network structure has a set of feasible neighbors, meaning they subscribe to the aforementioned constraints. In this research, four neighborhood variations are considered, named Swap 1, Swap 3, Swap 3-1, and Swap 3-2-1. The four variations relate to how much weight is changed in each simulated annealing iteration. A neighbor of the network structure defined by weight matrix W 1 is a network structure whose weight matrix W 2 satisfies 2 = 1 − and 2 = 1 + for exactly one pair j and k. That is, the only differences between W 1 and W 2 are two individual cells whose weights differ by a size of swap. A neighborhood is the set of all new network structures that satisfy the above criteria.
Two of the neighborhood variations (Swap 1 and Swap 3) are defined completely by the swap variable, where swap = 1 and swap = 3. The other two variations implement a progressive shift, where swap decreases as the simulation runs. For Swap 3-1, swap changes from three to one after 50 consecutive non-improving iterations. Swap 3-2-1 decrements swap from three to two after 25 consecutive non-improving iterations and from two to one after another 25. We examine the impact that these different neighborhoods have on solution convergence and final network structure.
Objective Function
For each candidate network structure W k , the discrete event simulation model is used to calculate the average network informed time across 1200 replications, 400 for each inject. This average network informed time, f (W k ), is the objective function for the simulated annealing procedure, the goal of which is to identify a network structure with very good f (W * ) in a reasonable computational time. This metric is chosen because fully informed network is the safest and most conservative parameter in a crisis communication scenario where information timeliness and accuracy are paramount. Also, there is no indication from the exercise that giving different emphasis to the three injects would make the simulation model more accurate.
Cooling Parameter and Stopping Conditions
As the simulated annealing process continues, it "cools" (an analogy to the metal annealing process from which the heuristic takes its name [Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi 1983] ). Solutions with non-improving objective function values are accepted by the heuristic, but this happens with decreasing probability as cooling occurs. This probability at iteration k, ρ k , is determined using the equation = (− Δ ) , where ∆ is the difference between f (W k ) and the objective function value of the most recently accepted network W A . Through regression analysis, we determined the best values for the cooling parameter c and scaling factor S to be c = 0.9995 and S = 100 (Pleuss 2016) .
We use the number of consecutive network structures in which there is no improvement n (we use n = 300) as the stopping condition for our simulation. This is consistent with the simulated annealing literature (Law 2007) and as the parameter increases, the algorithm's run time also increases. We conducted sensitivity analysis on n and discovered that values smaller than 300 yielded a slightly different best average informed time, while increasing n changed the best average informed times for each of the neighborhood variations by less than 0.1%.
Simulated Annealing Algorithm
The proposed simulated annealing heuristic, incorporating the components just described, is summarized in Algorithm 2 (Figure 6 ). The process is adapted from (Johnson and McGeoch 2003) to fit this research. After initialization, the main loop in the process (line 3) allows subsequent iterations until one of the stopping conditions is met. Lines 4 and 5 require the largest computation time, where a neighbor is chosen and then 1200 simulation replications are conducted to determine f (W k ). Lines 8 and 9 are required because it is possible that the most recently accepted network, W A , is not better than the current best known solution if line 14 accepted it in a prior iteration. The algorithm concludes by returning the best network structure identified and its respective average informed time. The proposed simulation model framework is based on the principles described in detail in (Law 2007) to ensure that results are accurate, are replicable, and provide the information needed to make useful conclusions. Our application of these principles, to include synchronizing the random number generator, allows us to assign all network performance differences to the changes in network structure and not randomness of the simulation.
Computational Results
Simulated Annealing Process
The simulated annealing heuristic is implemented with four neighborhood variations. For each neighborhood, the simulated annealing process is run five times and the best network structure among the five is reported as the final solution.
Although the neighborhoods yield different convergence rates to the final solutions, the solution quality is quite similar. The differences in convergence for the first of the five simulated annealing runs are illustrated in Figure 7 . Swap 3 converges to its best solution much faster than Swap 1, because Swap 1 makes smaller changes to the weights in each iteration. Swap 3-1 and Swap 3-2-1 make notable changes at iterations 275 and 700, when their swap values change. In the end, Swap 1 has more than two and a half times as many improving iterations as Swap 3, while Swap 3-1 and Swap 3-2-1 each have almost twice as many as Swap 3. So how does this convergence time affect the quality of the network structure? Interestingly, the differences are quite minimal. Figure 8 shows how the average informed time changes during the simulated annealing process for the four neighborhood variations. To make it possible to see differences, ln(f (W k )) is shown. The four neighborhood variations produce network structures with very similar average informed times, as shown in Table 4 . In summary, Swap 3-2-1 reaches a slightly better solution than Swap 1 in 68% as many iterations. 
Most Improved Network
This section focuses on the best information dissemination network structure identified using the proposed simulated annealing heuristic. Specifically, it compares the best network with the original network and analyzes the importance of individual arcs on network performance.
Comparison to Original Network
After conducting five unique simulated annealing processes for all four neighborhood variations (found in Table 4 ), the best network structure came from Swap 3-2-1 with an average informed time of 417.48 minutes. The resultant best network structure W * is shown in Figure 9 in the same format as the original network, W 0 , from Figure 3 . Comparing Figure 3 and Figure 9 , we make several observations. • There are fewer total arcs in W * than W 0 . In other words, it is often better for nodes to limit the number of nodes with which they communicate and focus on those interactions that benefit the network most.
• KDA (I) loses almost all of its incoming links. This is discussed further in Section 5.2.3.
• There is a large increase in communication between the county/local nodes, consistent with observations in Section 3, where we predicted that would be an impactful change.
• The County/Local Administration (B) and Kansas State EOC (G) nodes establish bi-directional communication after having no communication in W 0 .
• The Federal (D), Local Vets (M), and Individual Producer (E) nodes all dramatically increase their inbound communication. These were three of the last nodes to become informed in W 0 .
• The Unknown (R) node loses most of its incoming communication. This is expected and the reason that the capacity is set at one, to shift communication to where it is better suited for the network.
Important Arc Changes
In this section, we examine which arc changes are most important to network structure improvement. To do so, changes in average informed time are tracked for every simulated annealing iteration, regardless of whether the new network is accepted or not. After all iterations are complete, the average change in objective function when w ij loses weight is (Δ − ) while that for w ij gaining weight is (Δ + ). The result is a matrix with two cells for every cell in W * , (Δ − ) and (Δ + ). These elements are combined to produce a single time difference metric +/− = | (Δ − ) − (Δ + )| that communicates an arc's impact on the network. Typically, adding link weight will either improve or degrade network performance while removing weight does the opposite. The +/− value shows the overall difference in performance between these two. The + or -in + and − indicates whether gaining or losing weight on arc (i, j) results in greater benefit to network performance. The rows of Table 5 show, in non-increasing order, the top 10 most impactful arcs based on their time difference metrics. Consider the first network structure change. Changes to the weight of the arc from Industry Associations to Individual Producers creates a time difference of 16.45 minutes. It is in the + column indicating that adding weight to this arc decreases average informed time. The second most impactful arc is from KSU College of Veterinary Medicine to KDA with a − of 9.68 minutes, where removing arc weight benefits the network's performance. Neighborhood variations Swap 3-1 and Swap 3-2-1 produce better solutions than Swap 1 and Swap 3 do, at least in part because the former neighborhoods utilize changes to these high-impact arcs far better than do the latter. 
Change Analysis
Of all the observations about the best network structures produced by simulated annealing, the most obvious, most impactful, and potentially most concerning is the shift of nearly all arcs away from KDA (I). The total incoming weight to KDA (∑ =1 , ) is eight or nine in the solution produced by each neighborhood, compared to 111 in W 0 . Given that KDA is the coordinating agency for the FAD response, eliminating nearly all incoming communication could appear contradictory to the research goals. It is important to consider, however, that this simulation model equates all information passing as equal and there is no benefit for a node to receive information after it is already informed. This means that once KDA has reached its capacity, it no longer needs to receive anything. Its relatively low max compared to its outgoing links makes this surprising change more understandable. This drastic change in KDA does support a main observation from Section 3, that KDA may not have sufficient capacity to effectively manage all its communication demands. It serves as an information broker to the rest of the network but does not seem to have enough personnel to pull in communication from other nodes.
To further examine this, the maximum capacity for KDA is increased to examine the relationship between capacity, total incoming weight, and average network informed time. The Swap 3-2-1 neighborhood is used and one simulated annealing run is executed for KDA maximum capacity values ( max ) ranging from 13 (the value of the original network) to 100. Table 6 summarizes the results and shows a positive correlation between KDA's maximum capacity, the total incoming weight, and the average informed time for W * . KDA's total incoming weight in W 0 is 111 with an average informed time of 3570.31 minutes. With a capacity of 100, the total incoming weight is nearly identical (112), yet the average informed time is close to that of f (W * ) with the original capacities. In other words, with the same amount of total incoming weight and the right configuration in the rest of the network, KDA needs a capacity of 100 to approach a similar average informed time as was achieved in the best solutions. 
Discussion of Practical Applications and Extensions
These results have practical implications for improving the communication for future FAD responses or exercises in Kansas and beyond. First, the analysis reveals the important connection between capacity at key nodes and overall network performance. The best networks found by simulated annealing show the KDA node losing 92% of its incoming communication links. Increasing the capacity of the state's Department of Agriculture during a FAD response helps maintain the incoming information flow to the node while simultaneously keeping a near-optimal network informed time. This confirms earlier observations in Section 3.2.3 that the Department of Agriculture should increase its capacity in order to effectively manage information demand across the network and process incoming information. The methods we introduce can assist in determining appropriate capacity levels. While funding constraints may prevent permanent capacity increases, FAD response operating procedures should include a temporary augmentation of qualified personnel (perhaps from unaffected states or other units within the organization) to aid in response and communication efforts during an outbreak. Our framework also makes it possible for jurisdictions to identify key connections between nodes that have substantial impact on network informed times. Based on the case study results, we recommend increased communication between the various county/local nodes and industry-related nodes in Kansas, as this significantly improves information flow in the network. Similarly, the clusters in the case study results that are the last to be informed are isolated. Individual producers and local veterinarians are often separated geographically and socially from entities at the state government level where FAD response decisions must be made. The models we propose make it possible to identify these relationships and take action in advance. Increasing engagement with these groups before an outbreak occurs will help strengthen relationships and may decrease the time from detection to appropriate official response during a FAD outbreak.
This research brings to light the need for improved data to support model development and decision making in the FAD response communication context. For instance, adding moderators to FAD response exercises and requiring participants to log communications will help develop a more accurate network for further analysis. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to identify improved crisis communication networks using this modeling approach. The Kansas Department of Agriculture has already enhanced their data collection efforts during FAD exercises, and other agencies also stand to benefit by investing in data collection and analysis.
The modeling framework presented here provides a foundation for examining many questions that, while beyond this paper's scope, are important for further advances. For instance, in many applications it is important to capture not only the information transmission between sender and recipient, but also more complex dynamics. Some senders are more trusted than others, and some information may be partial. While this paper assumes that information receipt is binary, meaning a node is either informed or not informed, accounting for trust or the need to receive information from multiple sources will expand the model's applicability. This could be accomplished using weights or additional conditions in the network model. Another important group of questions concerns differences in the criticality of information recipients. The current study aims to minimize the average informed time of the entire network, but changing the objective function makes it possible to examine situations in which key nodes are prioritized. Hierarchical command and control structures can also be analyzed by changing the arcs and nodes that are present in the network model. Finally, our modeling framework makes it possible to explore the relationship between the availability of information content and network connectivity. A well-connected network cannot be effective in transmitting information that is not available, but strong connections can increase the likelihood that information originating at any node can efficiently be transmitted throughout the network.
The case study data and the current model have several limitations. First, not all stakeholders participated in the case study exercise, and not all communications among players are completely documented. In the absence of comparative performance data, it is not possible to determine the impact that missing players or incomplete data may have on communication across the network. Second, expert knowledge is needed to generate appropriate clusters for the network structure. The parameters for the simulated annealing metaheuristic need to be tuned to each application and are not necessarily generalizable to other datasets. Although the method identifies network structures with very good average informed times, these structures are not provably optimal. Future work could explore the use of exact methods, comparing the tradeoff between computational requirements and network performance. Metaheuristics, including simulated annealing, are widely applied to find good solutions to large-scale problems in a variety of application contexts (Gendreau and Potvin 2005; Bent and Hentenryck 2006; Vidal et al. 2013 ), but we have not explicitly tested the scalability of our proposed method to larger crisis communication networks.
Conclusions
This paper introduces a generalizable framework that allows decision makers to utilize communication instances captured in limited and imperfect data over multiple mediums, synthesize them into a network structure, simulate existing communication patterns, and identify improved network structures. The Kansas case study results demonstrate that the proposed method is an effective way to improve the crisis communication network structure of this FAD response exercise, decreasing the network average informed time from 3500 minutes to just 417 m inutes.
In summary, the ability to improve information flow between official responders and other stakeholders during an emergency event should be continually pursued as it has the potential to markedly improve matters of health and national security far beyond FAD outbreaks. The proposed method gives insight into potential policy and communications plan changes that can greatly improve emergency response and information flow in the most critical of circumstances. Figure 10 shows an example network. Table 7 gives the probability matrix for the example network in Figure 10 . To understand the informed time for a node and for the network, consider the following series of events using the example network in Figure 10 . The information to be transmitted originates at node A, indicating that a member of A was the first to have this information and communicate it with someone else in the network. This means that λ A = 1 at the start of the simulation while λ B , λ C , and λ D are each 0. Because max = 2, node A is not yet informed. Suppose node A first transmits to node B. Information transmission is binary in nature, meaning one cannot partially transmit information. This makes λ B = 1 and, because max = 1, node B becomes informed. The simulation continues until all nodes and, thus, the network, are informed.
Appendix I Network Model Example
Appendix II Simulation Model Replications
The process for computing the appropriate number of simulation replications is based on (Devore 2016) . To ensure with 95% confidence that the true average informed time is within 100 minutes of the observed average informed time from the simulation replications, an initial sample of 50 replications was taken. The required number of replications, r, comes from the following equation: = ( /2 * )
2
, where s is the sample standard deviation, t α/2 is the critical value of the student-t test, and B is the desired precision level (in our case 100). We found the required number of replications for each of the three injects to be 367.07, 292.88, and 327.72. Based on this information, we chose to perform 400 replications for each inject. Table 8 shows the comparison for how long it took for nodes to be informed of a presumptive positive FMD in the actual exercise versus our simulation model. Comparing the exercise and simulation times of each row suggests that the simulation model is, indeed, representing this information flow in the network closely, particularly for the first seven nodes, where the times differ on average by less than 15 minutes. Additionally, the simulation replicates the sequence of the first three nodes perfectly, and the nine exercise nodes that received the information are represented in the first 13 nodes of the simulation. The only other instance from the exercise with enough transmission documentation to analyze is when a bull with possible FMD is discovered in the Kansas State University College of Veterinary Medicine (L). This event most closely resembles inject 2 of the simulation where an individual producer (E) introduces information to the network. With this in mind, Table 9 shows the same comparison as the previous instance. All seven exercise nodes that received the information are represented within the first 11 nodes of the simulation. Also, the average difference in times for the individual nodes is less than 25 minutes. Thus, we conclude that the proposed simulation model is a valid representation of the crisis communication network from the exercise, and the remainder of the paper builds on this network simulation model. Notes 1 A local search heuristic is a solution approach for challenging optimization problems that moves between candidate solutions to identify a high-quality solution when finding a provably optimal solution is computationally intractable. Simulated annealing is one such heuristic whose steps are inspired by the metal annealing process (Kirkpatrick, Gelatt, and Vecchi 1983) . It is described in Section 4. 2 FMD is often confused with Hand, Foot, and Mouth Disease, which is transmitted among mostly young humans. FMD affects only cloven-hooved animals and cannot be contracted by humans (Banta et al. 2016 ).
Appendix III Simulation Model Validation
